Short answer: New Tor Circuit for this Site (URL-bar circuit panel) only reloads that site on a new path — new exit, same cookies, other tabs untouched. New Identity (hamburger ≡) closes every tab, clears cookies and history, and builds new circuits so the next task is harder to link to the last one. Neither button un-sends a form, and neither picks an exit country.
These are not security levels — those live in Tor Browser security levels.
How to find each control
- New Circuit for this Site — click the padlock / circuit icon on the URL bar → New Tor circuit for this site. Only this site’s tabs reload.
- New Identity — open the hamburger menu (≡) at the top-right → New Identity. Tor Browser warns that tabs will close and downloads may stop. Confirm only when you mean a clean session.
What each one does
| New Circuit for this Site | New Identity | |
|---|---|---|
| Where | URL-bar circuit panel | Hamburger ≡ |
| Tabs and windows | This site’s tabs reload | All close |
| Cookies, history | Kept | Cleared |
| Circuits | New path for this site only | New paths for all connections |
| Other open sites | Unchanged | Gone with the session |
| Downloads in progress | Not the point of the button | Stop — the browser warns first |
| Already posted data | Still sent | Still sent |
When to press which
Circuit — CAPTCHA loop, exit ban, or this clearnet page will not load. You want a different exit IP for this site. Cookies stay; the tracker on that site still knows the same browser session. The Project’s own wording: useful when the exit cannot connect or is not loading the site properly — same class of problem as why Tor “breaks” sites.
Identity — you finished one role and the next page must not carry the last site’s cookies, or you think this browser session is already linked to you. Example: you were logged into a mail tab and now want a separate research session. Every tab closes; start clean.
What not to expect
- You cannot usefully pick an exit country. The same identities page says modifying how Tor builds circuits is strongly discouraged; leaving route selection to the client is how you get the security the design intends. Geoblocks are a VPN problem, not a Tor Browser setting.
- New Circuit does not unlink you. Cookies, logins, and the first-party site context stay. A new exit with the same login is still the same person to that site.
- New Identity cannot unsay what you typed. It also does not hide a reused username or a writing style.
- Only this browser uses Tor. Other apps on the computer are not routed unless you configure them — or you use Tails.
Switching circuits by hand on every click is not a security upgrade. It puts more relays in contact with the session and does not erase an account you already created.
Sources
- Tor Project: Managing identities
- Tor Project: Tor Browser User Manual — managing identities
- Tor Project: Staying anonymous
See also: why Tor “breaks” sites, Tor + HTTPS, letterboxing and window fingerprint.