Short answer: On Android, install Tor Browser from Google Play, the Guardian Project’s F-Droid repository, torproject.org, or GetTor. There is no Tor Browser for iOS. The Tor Project points to Onion Browser, which uses Tor routing but must use Apple’s WebKit, so it cannot match desktop Tor Browser’s fingerprint defenses.
A phone is a radio, a camera, a microphone, and a bag of identifiers that do not exist on a laptop you control. Putting Tor Browser on it helps the browser path. It does not make the handset amnesic. For a live USB system that never runs on phones, see Tails.
Android: there is an official browser
The Tor Project ships Tor Browser for Android, based on Firefox for Android. Documented requirements (see the Tor Browser manual): Android 5.0 or newer; AArch64, ARM, x86_64, and x86. If you do not know the architecture, prefer an app store build rather than a sideloaded APK.
Official channels the project names:
- Google Play — Tor Browser for Android.
- F-Droid — via the Guardian Project official repository (not a random F-Droid mirror of an unofficial fork). The manual’s F-Droid steps start from f-droid.org, then add that repository, then install “Tor Browser for Android.”
- torproject.org and GetTor — when stores are blocked or you want the project’s own package.
Sideloading from a Telegram channel or a “dark web browser” landing page is the same phishing class as a fake desktop installer. Verify provenance the same way: project domain, expected publisher name, no certificate warnings. Desktop signature ceremony: PGP for Tor users. Store listings do not replace that ceremony, but they are still better than an unsigned APK from a directory.
First connection on Android
The mobile manual matches desktop habits: connect directly, or configure the connection if the network filters Tor. Connection Assist can try a bridge for your region when a direct circuit fails. Bridges help reachability; they are not extra anonymity. Background: Tor bridges.
“Always connect automatically” remembers the last method on that device. On a shared phone, a saved auto-connect setting can reveal that Tor is in use. That is a device-policy choice, not a network-layer upgrade.
Security levels (Standard / Safer / Safest) still trade site breakage against script attack surface. Adding random extensions or “privacy APKs” beside Tor Browser breaks the shared fingerprint the browser is built around — the same warning as on desktop. Walkthrough of defaults: Tor Browser setup.
What Android Tor Browser does not cover
Other apps on the phone still use the carrier, Wi-Fi, and Google (or vendor) services. Installing Tor Browser does not route mail, maps, or a messenger through Tor. Guardian Project’s Orbot is a separate proxy app some people use for that; it is not a substitute for Tor Browser’s hardened web profile, and this encyclopedia is not an Orbot cookbook.
Notifications, cloud backup, and “find my device” features keep working unless you change the OS. Treat the phone’s account as its own identity. Mixing a personal Play account with a research role is an OPSEC problem, not a Tor bug.
iOS: no Tor Browser
Apple requires third-party browsers to use WebKit. The Tor Project therefore does not ship Tor Browser for iPhone or iPad. Their documented recommendation is Onion Browser: open source, Tor routing, developed in close coordination with the project, distributed through the App Store (onionbrowser.com).
WebKit means Onion Browser cannot apply the same anti-fingerprinting and security-level model as Tor Browser on desktop or Android. It is a censored-network and onion-reachability tool with honest limits — not “Tor Browser with a different icon.” Apps named Tor Browser on iOS are not automatically official; the project’s sentence is specific: there is no Tor Browser for iOS.
Chrome OS and tablets
The Tor Project does not ship a Chrome OS build. Running the Android app on Chrome OS may show mobile site layouts and, by the project’s own note, has not been audited for the same privacy properties. Tails does not run on smartphones, tablets, Raspberry Pi, or Apple-silicon Macs; do not expect a live-USB escape hatch on a phone.
Phones as a threat-model object
TorWiki-style OPSEC checklists often say “leave the phone in another room.” Strip the crime-novel tone and the remaining fact is ordinary: a powered phone speaks to cell towers, retains location history, and is a second camera pointed at whatever you type. Tor Browser does not mute the radio.
Write the model before the install:
- Need less tracking in the browser on a device you already use? Android Tor Browser from an official channel is the designed answer.
- Need the fact of Tor use hidden from the local network? Bridges, not a different phone brand. See Tor vs VPN before stacking a random VPN.
- Need amnesia after shutdown? That is a PC + USB problem (Tails), not a handset setting.
Do not use the phone as a second factor for a role you are trying to keep off that phone. SMS 2FA on a clone site is how phishing finishes. Catalog language around 2FA: onion directories.
Common mistakes
Unofficial APKs; assuming an iOS app with “Tor” in the title is Tor Browser; routing only the browser and then logging into personal accounts; treating a mobile circuit as equivalent to a Tails session; downloading “VPN + Tor” bundles from onion indexes.
Conclusion
Mobile Tor is real on Android when the package comes from the channels the Tor Project names. On iOS it is a different, weaker product by platform rule. A phone remains a phone. Pair this page with phishing detection before you trust any on-device “Tor” extra, and with OPSEC before you mix roles.
Sources
- Tor Project: Tor Browser for Android / mobile
- Tor Project: Running Tor Browser (desktop and Android connect flow)
- Tor Project support: no official Tor Browser for iOS; Onion Browser and WebKit limits
- Onion Browser — iOS client the Tor Project recommends
- Tails: does not run on smartphones or tablets
- TorWiki: mobile/device isolation notes in OPSEC culture (paraphrased; not a software source)