Rendezvous Point
A Tor relay where client and hidden service circuits meet for onion service connections without revealing either party's network location to the other.
When a client connects to an onion service, the two sides never meet directly. The client picks a relay at random — the rendezvous point — and builds a circuit to it. The service, pointed there through its Introduction Points, builds its own circuit to the same relay. The rendezvous point stitches the two circuits together and passes encrypted cells between them.
Why this design exists
Each side sees only the rendezvous point, never the other’s IP address. The service keeps its location hidden; the client stays as anonymous as on any Tor connection. No Exit Node is involved at all: onion service traffic never leaves the Tor network, which removes the entire class of exit-based eavesdropping.
What the rendezvous point knows
Remarkably little. It is chosen by the client, so the service cannot bias the choice toward a relay it controls, and it learns neither the client’s address nor the service’s — only that two circuits meet. The full handshake is defined in the Tor rendezvous specification; the address layer above it is described under Onion Service v3.
Category: Network